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Ex Post # Ex Ante
Determining Liability in Hindsight*
Kim A. Kamint and Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit

Participantsin three conditions(foresight,hindsight,and a modifiedhindsightconditiondesigned to
amelioratethe hindsighteffect) assessed whethera municipalityshould take, or have taken, precautions to protecta riparianpropertyowner fromflood damage.In the foresightcondition,participants
reviewedevidence in the context of an administrativehearing.Hindsightparticipantsreviewedparallel
materialsin the context of a trial.Threequartersof the participantsin foresightconcludedthat a flood
was too unlikely to justify further precautions-a decision that a majorityof the participantsin
hindsightfound to be negligent.Participantsin hindsightalso gave higherestimatesfor the probability
of the disasteroccurring.The debiasingprocedurefailed to produceany significantdifferencesfrom
the regularhindsightcondition.The results suggest that absent an effective debiasingtechnique,risk
assessments made in foresightwill be judged harshlyin hindsight.

Life involves risk and danger. The potentialfor accidental harm looms in every
environmentand situation. When careless conduct causes an accident, injuring
people or damagingproperty,the Americantort system obliges a party who has
negligentlycaused damageto pay for it. The tort system recognizes that not every
accident is the productof negligence. Toobtaincompensation,a plaintiffsuingfor
negligence must prove four things: (1) The defendantowed a duty of care to the
plaintiff; (2) the duty was breached; (3) the breach caused (4) damage to the
plaintiff(AmericanLaw Institute [ALI], 1965,p. 4). Negligence law requiresthat
* The authors gratefullyacknowledgethe supportand advice of David L. Rosenhan and Barbara
Tversky. Commentsby Derek Koehler and three anonymousreviewers greatly improvedearlier
drafts. The assistance of Steve Cole, Sonja Lyubomirsky,Phoebe Garfield,and GarnerWengwas
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judgment of the second element, whether the defendant's conduct breached a
duty of care, be based on the defendant'sknowledgebefore the plaintiffs injury
(ALI, 1965,p. 68). Yet, the legal system necessarilyjudges a defendant'sconduct
after the harmhas occurred. Research on humanjudgment suggests that people
cannot ignore a known outcome when assessing an event's likelihood-a phenomenon known as "the hindsightbias" (Fischhoff, 1975). In this article, we
address the possibility that the hindsightbias may make precautionsthat seem
reasonablein foresight look inadequatein hindsight.
In most negligence suits, defendantsare liable only for consequences arising
from theirfailureto exercise "reasonablecare" in avoidinginjuryto the plaintiff.
Legal scholars have describedreasonablecare in terms of a cost-benefit analysis
(ALI, 1965,pp. 54-57). As articulatedby JudgeLearnedHand, "if the probability
[of an injury]be called P; the injury,L; and the burden[of precautions]B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multipliedby P"(United States v. Carroll
TowingCo., 1947, p. 173). In effect, if an accident's cost multipliedby the probability of its occurrence outweighs the cost of untakenprecautions,a defendant
may be foundliablefor breachingthe duty of reasonablecare (Grady,1989).Judge
Hand's formulahas attractedwidespreadsupportand is "the negligencestandard
most often cited in legal discussions of the problem" (Brown, 1973, p. 194). In
fact, it remainsthe fundamentaldescriptionof reasonablecare in tort law treatises
(Keeton, 1984,p. 173), and is embodiedinjury instructions(Devitt, Blackmar,&
Wolf, 1987, P. 138). It has even been applied to the causation element of negligence (Grady, 1983;Landes & Posner, 1983).
In the applicationof the Hand formulato a defendant'sconduct, a judge or
jury must assess the costs and benefits of precautionsbased upon what the defendant should have known when makingthe judgment, regardlessof what has
been learned after the fact (ALI, 1965, p. 68). This requiresmakinga post hoc
evaluation of "what particularprecautionsthe defendantcould have taken, but
did not" (Grady,1989,p. 140). To correctlyapply Hand's formulaand determine
liability,legal decision makersmust make ex post (afterthe fact)judgmentsof the
ex ante (before the fact) probabilities.In effect, a properadjudicationof reasonable care requiresajudge orjury to disregardthe obvious fact that the precautions
failed to prevent an accident (Devitt et al., 1987, p. 138).
The Hindsight Bias
Ignoringa known outcome while recreatinga decision is a difficultcognitive
task. In making such judgments, people overestimate both the probabilityof
the known outcome and the ability of decision makers to foresee the outcome
(Fischhoff, 1975). When trying to reconstructwhat a foresightfulstate of mind
would have perceived, people remain anchored in the hindsightfulperspective.
This leaves the reportedoutcome looking much more likely than it would look to
the reasonableperson without the benefit of hindsight(Fischhoff, 1982a,p. 343).
Researchon the hindsightbias has demonstratedthe effect in a diverse range
of subject populations across varied laboratoryand applied settings. Detmer,
Fryback,and Gassner(1978)reporteda hindsightbias in surgeonsappraisingsur-
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gical cases. Arkes, Wortmann,Saville, and Harkness(1981)found it among physicians assessing a medical diagnosis. Pennington,Rutter,McKenna, and Morely
(1980)found it in women reactingto the results of a pregnancytest. The bias has
also been found in voters' election predictions(Leary, 1982),in nurses' employee
evaluations (Mitchell & Kalb, 1982), and may contributeto the phenomenon of
blaminga rape victim for her misfortune(Carli& Leonard, 1989). These studies
suggest the robustness of the bias across a variety of subjects, situations, and
tasks.
The Hindsight Bias and Legal Decision Making
The hindsightbias' potential relevance to law has not escaped the notice of
legal and psychological scholars. In discussing a demonstrationof the hindsight
bias in medical diagnosis, Arkes (1989)claimed that the bias could affect liability
judgments in misdiagnosiscases. Since a failure to diagnose a disorderwill look
much more culpableafterdiscoveringthe true natureof an illness, doctors may be
subject to liability even for reasonablediagnosticproceduresthat turn out badly.
Wexler and Schopp (1989) expressed similar concerns about doctors sued for
"negligently" releasing psychiatricpatients who later commit violent acts.
Researchers have conducted several empirical demonstrationsof the hindsight bias in legal settings. In a study by Bodenhausen(1990),undergraduatesread
case summariescontainingthe results of jury deliberations.The study revealed
that the jury's conclusion heavily influenced subject evaluations of the defendant's culpability. Casper, Benedict, and Perry (1989) had students and adults
called for jury service assess openingand closing argumentsin a hypotheticalsuit
againstpolice officers who allegedlyhad conductedillegal searches. Althoughthe
legality of a search does not depend on its outcome, both types of participants
were more sympatheticto the plaintiffwhen the search uncovered nothing than
when it uncovered damningevidence againsthim. Kagehiro,Taylor,Laufer, and
Harland(1991) extended Casper's findings, concentratingon the hindsightbias'
influence on judicial review of third-partyconsent to warrantless searches. In
their study, undergraduatesread vignettes describinga warrantlesspolice search
and then responded to a questionnaire. Results indicated that search outcome
heavily influencedjudgments of the search's legality.
Because decision makingin a legal context differsfrom nonlegal demonstrations of hindsight, in both complexity and the influence that previously held
attitudeshave on its outcome (e.g., Thompson,Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington,
1984),one might suppose it to be immunefrom the bias' influence. These studies
suggest otherwise. As these studies show, neitherthe attitudinalvariablesnor the
complexity of legal decisions appearsto mitigatethe bias' effect.
Tortlaw itself lacks a generic empiricaldemonstrationof the hindsightbias.
Although Wexler and Schopp (1989) provide a fairly detailed discussion of the
effects the bias might have on psychiatric malpracticecases, they collected no
data. Furthermore,Wexlerand Schopp (1989)limit their discussion to psychiatric
malpractice.In recognitionof the generalityof the effect, however, they include
a commentby professorRobertRabinthat "negligentrelease cases appearsimply
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to be a varianton the generalstructureof accidentlaw" (Wexler& Schopp, 1989,
p. 489). As this comment indicates, the hindsightbias problemprobablyextends
beyond psychiatricmalpractice.Indeed, Saks (1986)has suggested that foreseeability issues in tort law could occupy a lifetime of research.
Debiasing Techniques
Demonstrationof pervasivebias in a significantareaof law begs the question
of a remedy. Unfortunately,the hindsightbias has proven resistantto most debiasing techniques (Fischhoff, 1982b).Attempts to undo the hindsighteffect with
strategies that rely on motivation, such as suggesting to people that they try
harder(Davies, 1987;Fischhoff, 1977),increasingpersonalrelevance of the task
(Connolly & Bukszar, 1990),and rewardingpeople for unbiasedresponses (Hell,
Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Muller, 1988), have proven ineffective. Furthermore, alertingpeople to the bias' influencedoes not mitigatethe effect (Fischhoff,
1977; Kurtz & Garfield, 1978; Wood, 1978). Some researchers have obtained
limited debiasing by significantlyrestructuringthe decision-makingtask (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978),or by havingparticipantsconsideralternative
outcomes (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986).
Although these cognitive strategies have reduced the influence of the bias, no
known technique completely eliminatesthe effect.
Wexler and Schopp (1989) considered debiasing strategies suitable for the
courtroom. They suggested bifurcatingtrials to avoid prejudicefrom knowing
outcomes whilejudgingnegligence.Bifurcationof trials, in fact, may decrease the
liabilityjuries attributeto defendants(Horowitz & Bordens, 1990;Zeisel & Callahan, 1967). However, as Wexlerand Schopp admit, bifurcationis an imperfect
solution. It is unlikely that the jury determiningnegligence could be kept completely ignorantof the fact that an accident has occurred. Furthermore,although
bifurcationof liability and damage issues is common, bifurcationto avoid outcome knowledge is unprecedented.Wexler and Schopp's proposal may be the
only method for completely eradicatingthe bias, but it presents enormouspractical difficulties.
A less intrusivecourtroomtechniquewould be to incorporatethe successful
cognitive debiasing techniques into jury instructions. As Wexler and Schopp
(1989) explain, these instructionsmust do more than merely admonishjurors to
disregardoutcome information.Rather,they should employ successful debiasing
techniques, such as imaginingalternativeoutcomes. If written in plain language,
reviewed before revealingthe evidence, and then repeatedat the end of the trial,
these instructionsmight impact the decision-makingprocess. Alternatively,expert testimony could serve the same function, much as it does in cases involving
eyewitness identification(Loftus, 1993). In addition, the defense attorney could
make efforts to restructurethe case to avoid the bias, or induce other decision
makingheuristicsfavorableto a defendantsuch as counterfactualreasoning-the
mental "undoing" of an adverse event (e.g., Miller & McFarland,1986;Wells,
Taylor,& Turtle, 1986).
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The Present Experiment
The present experimenttested the influence of the hindsightbias in a negligence suit and the effectiveness of jury instructionsas a debiasing method. The
study compared participants'evaluations in an administrativehearing (choosing
precautionsfor a potentialaccident)to those in a mock trial(in which an accident
had alreadyoccurred).A second hindsight-trialconditionwas identicalto the first
except for the addition of debiasing instructionsdesigned to reduce probability
estimates and findings of liability.
The stimuli in the present experimentdepicted a situationsimilarto that of a
famous tort case, Petition of Kinsman TransitCo. (1964). In the foresight condition, participantslearnedthat a city had constructeda drawbridgeand needed to
determine whether the risk of a flood warrantedmaintaininga bridge operator
duringthe winterwhen the bridgewas not in use. Hiringthe operatorwould serve
as a precaution. The operator would monitor weather conditions and raise the
bridge if the river threatenedto flood. The foresightcondition asked participants
without outcome knowledge to decide whether a flood was sufficiently probable
for the city to appropriatefunds for the operator.
The hindsightmanipulationscontainedthe same backgroundfacts. The story
continued, however, stating that the city had decided not to hire the operator.
During the first winter of the bridge's existence, debris lodged under it. This
resultedin a flood that could have been preventedhad an operatorbeen hired. The
flood damageda neighboringbakery,whose owner then sued the city. Participants
in the hindsightcondition were instructedto hold the city liable if the flood was
sufficientlyprobablethat the city shouldhave hiredthe operatorto preventit. The
second hindsight condition added a debiasing manipulationin which the judge
instructed participants to recognize the influential effects of hindsight and to
consider alternativeoutcomes as had the city in foresight. All three conditions
requiredparticipantsto base their decisions on a criticalpercentagederivedfrom
the applicationof Judge Hand's reasonablecare formulation.
The stimuli consisted of an audio-tape with an accompanying slide-show.
Each subject heard one of the three versions of the stimuli (foresight, hindsight,
or debiasing). Dependent variables were the participants'ratings of probability
and their ultimate decision to hire the operator or hold the city responsible for
failingto hire an operator.Othermeasures(whetherthe city should pay damages,
how well the two opposingsides had done, how realisticthe simulationswere, and
how difficult it was to decide the accident's probability)served as manipulation
checks.
The primaryhypothesis was that participantsin the foresightconditionwould
be less inclined to take the precautionthan participantsin the hindsightcondition
would think they should have been. We expected these decisions to correspond
with higher probabilityestimates generatedby participantsin the hindsightconditions. We also expected that hindsightparticipantswould tend to think the city
should pay for flood damages more than foresight participantswould. For the
manipulationchecks, we predictedthat hindsightwould influence the case alone
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and would not affect evaluationsof the attorneysor the simulationitself. Finally,
participantsin the debiasingconditionshouldgive lower probabilityestimatesand
be less likely to hold the city liable than those in the hindsightcondition. Since
other studies show that this debiasingstrategytends to reduce the bias, but not
eliminateit, we expected a similareffect in this study.
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-six undergraduatesat StanfordUniversity, 37 women and 39 men,
received either $5 in cash or course creditin an introductorypsychology class for
their voluntaryparticipationin the study.
Experimental Materials
Separatetranscriptsfor each of the threeconditions(foresight,hindsight,and
debiasing)were read onto audio-tapeby actors. The tapes each lasted approximately 30 minutes. The foresighttape depictedan administrativehearingof "The
Duluth UrbanPlanningCommittee,"while the two hindsighttapes presentedthe
same information in the form of a civil trial, Continental Bakeries, Inc., v. City of

Duluth. Each role in the foresight condition had an analogous part in the trial
conditions, and the same actors performedin all three versions. In the administrative hearing, one member of the committee board advocated taking the precautionand played a role analogousto the plaintiffs attorneyin the trialversions.
Similarly,another administratoropposed the precaution, thereby assuming the
defense attorney'sposition. The secretaryof the committeemirroredthe bailiffin
the trial. A neutral chairmanmirroredthe judge. Six witnesses appearedin the
same order in both the administrativehearingand the trial versions of the story.
Where appropriate,multipleconditionscontainedrecordingsof identicalmaterials. In all conditions,two exhibitsdiscussed in the audio-tapewere madeavailable
to the participantsduringthe presentation.
The presentationalformatwas standardizedas a slide-show with the accompanying audio-tape.The slides presented differentmodels posing as each of the
characters.The backgroundfor the witnesses was a starkpaneled wall; two witnesses were standingin front of a wooden door, while all the others were sitting
in what looked like a wooden witness stand. Each conditionused the same slides
in the same order. The only exception was that the slides for the judge and the
bailiffdifferedfromthose for the correspondingchairmanand the secretaryof the
planningcommittee. These differenceswere necessary to show the judge in robes
and the bailiffin uniform.Transcriptsand all othermaterialsare availablefromthe
authors on request.
Opening Instructions

The opening instructionsin each of the conditions containedonly those differences necessary to create the settingfor the manipulations.The foresighttape
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began with the committee chairmandescribing the administrativesetting. The
hindsighttapes opened with the judge describingthe trial setting. Below are the
actual instructions(with the hindsighttext indicatedin italics):
First, [both parties have agreed to] let me give you an abbreviatedversion of the
[situation/factswhich are not in dispute]. [Last May/DuringMay 1988], the City of
Duluthcompletedconstructionof a drawbridgeacross the mouthof the Miniwapariver.
The Miniwapariversees a considerableamountof commercialtrafficduringthe summer
and early fall from many upstreambusinesses. Duringthe monthsof Decemberthrough
April, the river is usuallyfrozen. Hence, there is no commerceon the waterwayin the
winter. Duringthe active months, the city maintainsa bridgeoperator24 hours a day,
seven days a week, so that the bridgecan be lowered or raised at any time. The city
[presently is deciding whether or not to employ a bridge operatorduringthe winter
months/decidednot to employ a bridge operatorduring the winter months. It is this
decision that is in contentionhere today].

The foresight tape then explained:
The City Disaster PreparednessCommissionhas alerted us to the fact that some
possibilityof winterand springfloodingexists as a resultof the new bridge.A flood could
be caused by a prematurethaw or else by ice and debrisgettingcaughtunderthe bridge
so as to create a dam. A flood would be a terribleevent, potentiallycausing severe
damageto propertyalong the bankof the river.Employinga bridgeoperatorduringthe
winter and spring would alleviate this threat, but is fairly costly. The decision as to
whether or not the city should hire an operatoris the decision that is in question here
today. I am tornbetweenthe two options. But two othermembersof our committee,Ms.
Sugal and Mr. Markwell,have chosen sides and we will hearfroma series of visitors to
help you make your decision. My ambivalencearises from the uncertaintyassociated
with the probabilityof a flood occurring.I would like you to review the availabletestimony to determinehow likely it is that a flood will occur duringthe wintermonths.

The hindsighttapes explained instead:
Duringthe middleof March1989,the weatherturnedunexpectedlywarm, and the
normallyfrozen Miniwapariver began to thaw. When it thawed, the river approached
flood stages and turnedinto a violent torrent,filled with ice floes. On the nightof March
17, 1989,the rivercrested at eighteenfeet high, only two feet below the bottom of the
new bridge.Whilethis occurred,a bargebrokeloose upstream.This bargelodged under
the bridge, and along with numerouslarge chunks of ice, created a temporarydam,
blockingthe flow of water underthe bridge.This backlogresultedin the riverflooding
upstreambefore the bridgecould be raised. Had the bridgebeen raised, it would have
freed the bargeandthe ice and preventedthe riverfromflooding.The flood only affected
ContinentalBakeries' propertyand a publicparkowned by the city.

Finally, the debiasing tape included these additionalinstructions:
Decidingthis case will eventuallyrequireyou to make a determinationabout the probability that a flood like the describedone will occur in any given year. Makingsuch an
assessment may be difficultsince the accident has alreadyoccurred.When listeningto
the evidence, you should consider how the events which led up to the accident could
have turnedout differently.

Testimony

Followingthe opening instructions,the six witnesses were questionedby the
committee members/attorneys.The opposingcharactersfirst made opening statements and then called the witnesses.

KAMINAND RACHLINSKI

96

The first witness, a meteorologist discussing yearly water levels, testified that
in the past 60 years the river had crested to dangerous levels on 14 occasions in
five different years. He also introduced a memorandum describing each of these
instances. On none of these occasions did the river rise to the level of the new
drawbridge. The next witness, a civil engineer for the City Disaster Preparedness
Commission, discussed the possibility that a flood could occur if ice, debris, or
loose boats lodge under the bridge, forming a dam. This witness introduced a
memorandum written by the City Disaster Preparedness Commission. The memorandum described several hazards posed by the new bridge, including automobile accidents, boat collisions, and flooding. It explained that enough ice or debris
caught under the bridge could create a backlog and cause a flood. It also recommended that the city consider employing a bridge operator throughout the winter
to monitor the bridge. The third witness was the accounting officer of the Planning
Committee. She stated that the flood precaution (i.e., hiring an operator for the
winter) would cost the city $100,000 annually, while the cost of the potential
damages from a flood was approximately $1,000,000 per occurrence-ten times
the cost of prevention on an annual basis.
Next, the chairman of the City Disaster Preparedness Commission testified
on behalf of the opponent/defendant. He attacked the credibility of the "overzealous" civil engineer who had testified for the proponent/plaintiff. The second
witness for the opponent/defendant was the current dock inspector. He stated that
in his ten years of experience no boats had broken loose on the river during the
winter. The final witness, a retired dock inspector, rebutted this testimony. He
claimed that in his 40 years of service boats had broken loose four or five times,
although under cross examination he could not specifically recall the occasions
when this occurred.
Closing Arguments
Following the testimony, the opposing sides each made closing arguments to
highlight the facts supporting their respective points. The proponent/plaintiff
claimed that the flood was a likely event that should be/have been prevented. The
opponent/defendant claimed that the flood was too unlikely to warrant the costs of
prevention. In the debiasing condition, the defense attorney also asked the participants to imagine the possibility that the flood had not occurred, and to consider
the waste of hiring a bridge operator "who would sit in a booth every hour of
every day in the winter to watch for floods."
Closing Instructions
The tapes' closing instructions were as follows (the hindsight text is in italics):
The law also gives you a clear definitionas to which precautionsare reasonable,and
which are not. In decidingwhetherthe employmentof a bridgeoperatorthroughoutthe
winter [is/was] a reasonableprecaution,you must considerthe economics of the decision. If the precaution[will prevent/wouldhaveprevented]moreharmthanits cost, then
the city is responsiblefor not takingthe precaution.If, however, the precautioncosts
more than the harm it would have prevented,then the city is not responsible.When
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makingthis determination,you must take into account the probability[of an accident
occurring/thatthe accident was going to occur. This evaluation must be one of the
probabilitythat the flood would have occurredgiven the informationavailable at the
time the decision not to hire was made, not as of now].
The law makes the task fairly simplehere. [Weknow that the damagefrom a flood
wouldcost/Theparties have stipulatedto the amountof damages at] $1,000,000[and the
defense has stipulatedthat this is the amountof damage they predicted]. [The annual
cost of eliminatingthe risk of the flood by employingthe operatoris/Also, both parties
have stipulatedto the cost of precautions]:$100,000.The only numbermissingfromour
calculationis the probability[of a flood/thattheflood was going to occur]. It is yourjob
to supply that number.Therefore,if you find that the probabilityof a preventableflood
each year exceeds 10%then you must [agreewith Ms. Sugalthat the city shouldhire an
operator/sidewith the plaintiffl. If you find that the probabilityof a flood is less than
10%,then [you must side with Mr.Markwellthat an accidentis too unlikelyto be worth
the cost of hiringan operator/thecity is not responsiblefor theflood since theprecaution
was not reasonable under the circumstances].The [committee/court]has provided a
special verdictformwhich includesthese instructions.Youare to fill out this formwhen
deciding the case. [The committee thanks you for your participationas an auxiliary
member/Thankyou for your attention.]

In the debiasing tape the judge added a final admonishment:
Makinga fair determinationof probabilitymay be difficult.As we all know, hindsight
vision is always 20/20. Thereforeit is extremelyimportantthat beforeyou determinethe
probabilityof the outcomethat did occur, you fully explore all other possiblealternative
outcomes which could have occurred.Please take a momentto thinkof all the ways in
which the event in question may have happeneddifferentlyor not at all.

The Questionnaire
After watching the simulatedmeeting or trial, participantsreceived a threepage questionnaire.The questionnairewas entitled "Final DeterminationForm"
in the foresight condition, and "Final VerdictForm" in the hindsightconditions.
The first page asked participantsto provide estimates for "the probabilityof a
preventable flood in any year." It then asked them to give their opinion as to
whether the city "should hire an operator" or "was responsible for the flood
damage." On the next page, the questionnaireasked participantsto provide a
written explanationfor their decisions.
The final page asked participantsto agree or disagree with five short statements using 7-point Likert scales. These statements were: "(1) The [proponent/
plaintiffs attorney]did a goodjob arguingher position;(2) The [opponent/defense
attorney] did a good job arguinghis position; (3) The City of Duluth should be
made to pay for damages [if a flood were to occur because of the absent bridge
operator];(4) The [meeting/trial]simulationwas realistic; and (5) It was difficult
to decide the correct probability."
Procedure
Participantswere run alone or in pairs. They entered the room and were
greeted by a female experimenterwho instructed them to serve as committee
members or jurors in a decision-makingtask. They were told to pay careful
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attention to the slide and audio presentationthat would describe the decisionmaking task. At appropriatetimes during the presentation, participantswere
given written copies of the exhibits being discussed. At these times the experimenter said: "You will now receive a copy of Exhibit [A/B] to look over briefly
and then referto as it is discussed." Participantswere instructednot to take notes.
Upon completion of the slide and audio presentation, the experimenter
turned on the lights and gave participants the "Final Determination/Verdict
Form" and writtencopies of the closing statementsand instructions.Participants
run in pairs were instructed to work individuallyand to avoid discussing their
answers. All participantswere allotted ten minutes in which to complete the
questionnaire.The participantswere then debriefed about the backgroundand
hypothesis behindthe experiment.At this time they were informedabout all three
conditions, told of the experimentalpredictions, and given the opportunityto
discuss the experiment.

RESULTS
Preliminaryanalyses revealed no significanteffects involving sex of subject
and whether or not they were paid. Therefore,the results are reportedcollapsed
across these variables.
Of the participantsin the foresightcondition, only 24%(6 out of 25) chose to
hire the operator, whereas 56.9% (29 out of 51) of those in the two combined
hindsightconditionsbelieved that the defendantshouldhave hiredthe operator:a
statisticallysignificantdifference,X2(1, n = 76) = 7.3, p < .01. A similaranalysis
comparingthe hindsight cell to the debiasing cell showed no significantdifferences; 57.7%in the hindsightcondition (15 out of 26) found the defendantliable
versus 56.0%in the debiasingcondition(14 out of 25) found the defendantliable,
X2 (1, n = 51) = .01, p > .5.

Two problemswith the distributionsof the probabilityestimatesled us to use
a nonparametricanalysis on this variable.First, the distributionswere positively
skewed. Second, a smaller number of the estimates were extremely popular
among the participants(e.g., 14 participantschose 5% and 11 chose 15%).This
made a transformationsomewhat meaninglessand generally muted the level of
variance in the data. Consequently, the data were analyzed using the MannWhitney Rank Test. Comparingthe foresight condition with the two hindsight
conditions revealed that participantsin hindsightmade significantlyhigher estimates of the probabilitythat the accidentwould occur in any given year, U = 436,
p < .025. Participantsin the debiasingconditiondid not differfrom the ordinary
hindsight condition, U = 301, p > .5.

Furtheranalyzingonly participantswho chose to hire the operator(or to hold
the city liable)indicatedthat the hindsightparticipants'likelihoodestimates were
only slightly,and not significantly,higherthanthe foresightones, U = 86, p > .5.
The mean probabilitieswere 15.85for the foresightparticipantsand 17.78for the
hindsight participants.Similarly,among participantswho chose not to hire the
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operator(or to exonerate the city) probabilityestimates did not differsignificantly
(foresight = 7.03, hindsight = 6.53, U = 183.5, p > .1). This suggests that

participantscould have first decided whetherthe flood was more likely than 10%,
and then chosen a particularprobabilityanchoredon the 10%cutoff.
The remainingdata fromthe 7-pointLikertscales (measuringthe simulation's
realism, the difficultyin decidingthe probability,the effectiveness of the opposing
advocate characters, and whether or not the city should pay damages) were analyzed using a 2 x 3 ANOVA, with main effects of choice (hire/holdliable vs.
don't hire/don't hold liable) and condition (foresight, hindsight, and debiasing).
Participantswho chose to hire/holdliable agreed with the statementthat the city
should pay for accident damages significantlymore than participantswho chose
not to hire or hold the city liable, F(1,70) = 15.7, p < .001. This rating did not
differby condition, F(2,70) = 2.0, p > .1. Nor did the interactionbetween choice
and condition affect the rating,F(2,70) = 0.2, p > .5. Analysis of the participants'
ratingsof the simulation'srealismand of the task difficultyrevealed no significant
main effects or interactions,F's < 2.8, p's > .05.
Participants'ratingsof the effectiveness of the proponent/plaintiffs attorney
did not differ by condition, choice or their interaction,F's < 2.3, p's > .1. The
ratings of opponent/defense attorney did not differ by choice, F(1,70) = .05,
p > .5, but the effect of conditionwas significant,F(2,70) = 4.4, p < .01. (Means
are 4.12, 3.00, 3.60, for foresight, hindsight, and debiasing, respectively, with
higher numbers indicating a worse rating.) Post hoc analysis using the TukeyHonestly SignificantDifferencestest revealedthat this effect was drivenprimarily
by the low ratinggiven by the hindsightparticipantsin contrast to the foresight
participants.No other contrasts were significant.The interactionbetween choice
and condition did not significantlyaffect ratingsof the defense attorney's effectiveness, F(2,70) = .67, p > .5.

DISCUSSION
These results demonstrate that the hindsight bias influences judgments of
liability.In this study, outcome knowledgedeeply affected participants'interpretations of a complex story. A majorityof participantsrandomlyassigned to the
hindsightconditionjudged the choice made by over three quartersof the foresight
participantsto be negligent. As the study shows, a good faith effort to determine
a reasonable level of precautionsin foresight may receive harshjudgment when
viewed in hindsight.
The data did not support the secondary hypothesis; the judicial debiasing
instructionsfailed to reduce the hindsightbias. There are several possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of the debiasinginstructions.The instructionsmay
simply have been missed or ignored in the context of the full trial. Research on
jury instructions shows that they often do not produce their desired effects (Diamond, 1993; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973), or that they may even have a
counterproductiveinfluence (Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981).
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Alternatively,participantsmay not have actively followed the instructionsto
"consider how the events that led up to the accident could have turned out
differently."Unlike this experiment,the successful debiasingstudies all required
their participantsto actually state reasons why other outcomes may have occurred (Arkes et al., 1988) or to list supportingfacts for various potential outcomes (Davies, 1987). Confined by the context of a court hearing, the present
study indicates that merely encouragingparticipantsto "imaginealternativeoutcomes" may not be adequatefor reducingthe bias. Althoughthis study tested a
techniqueeasily suitablefor the courtroom,its failuresuggeststhat'moreintrusive
proceduresmight be necessary to counteractthe bias' influence.
The data support the hypothesis that the hindsightbias would affect judgments of the events and not the charactersinvolved. Participants'evaluationsof
the opposing characters' abilities and of the simulationin general did not differ
between conditions, except that hindsightparticipantsratedthe opponent/defense
attorney's performancesignificantlyhigher than did the foresight participants.
This findingis difficultto explain, and the effect is in the opposite directionfrom
what the hindsightbias mightpredict. Hindsightparticipantsfelt that the defense
attorneydid a betterjob, despite expressingmore disagreementwith his position.
The meaningof this effect is unclear.
There may be other limitationswithin the study, as well. Participantsin the
trialconditionswere not given instructionson the plaintiff'sburdenof proof. This
was to ensure that the two conditionswere parallel,but it did result in a deviation
fromnormaltrialprocedures.Since hindsight'sinfluencewas so large(57%versus
24%), the effect should have occurred anyway, but this variance from normal
proceduresmay have exacerbatedthe effect size.
Additionally,the study tested individualjudgments rather than those of a
jury. The sample is unrepresentativeof a typicaljury pool, and no groupdeliberation occurred. However, researchers(e.g., Casperet al., 1989)have found college student samples to display the hindsightbias in patterns similar to adults
called for jury service. Furthermore,at present the effects of group deliberation
on the hindsightbias are unknown.In reality,juries decide few civil suits. Bench
trials have become increasinglypopular(Hans & Vidmar,1986),and more importantly, the vast majorityof cases settle before trial (Lempert& Saunders, 1986).
Hence, the outcome of civil suits is determinedprimarilyby attorneysand clients
reviewing the merits of their case, or by arbitratorsand mediators. This means
that liabilityjudgments are often decided by individualsratherthan by groups.
One might argue that data from undergraduatesdo not apply to the decision
making of attorneys or arbitrators,but the robust nature of the hindsight bias
across differingpopulationssuggests otherwise.
The differences in the instructionsand testimony or even the basic differences in format(meetingvs. trial)could also be said to accountfor the results. Yet
differences in the instructions and testimony probably cannot account for the
effect because there were so few. The instructionsnecessarily differed, as described in the methods section, but requiredthe participantsto make the same
assessment. The substance of each witness' testimony did not vary, and the text
itself was practicallyidentical.
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The basic formatmay have had some effect. While an administrativehearing
demandsan honest assessment of accidentlikelihood,trialstend to focus more on
the assignment of blame. The possibility exists that these may be fundamentally
different chores. In this study, however, participantsin each condition were instructed to base their decisions on their probabilityjudgments. Furthermore,not
only were hindsightparticipantsmore likely to judge the city liable, but they also
estimated higher annual flood likelihood. This suggests that the hindsight bias,
ratherthan a differencein tasks, drove the effect. Finally,even if the basic format
made a difference, then the implicationsfor law would be the same. Potential
defendantswho take what appearto be reasonableprecautionsin foresight might
find their choices indefensibleonce being sued.
One aspect of analysis indicates that somethingother than the hindsightbias
may have driven the effect. After accountingfor the decision to hire/holdliable,
hindsight participants' probability estimates are only slightly, and not significantly, higher than those of the foresight participants.Thus, arguablythe data
cannot distinguish participantswho decided liability first and then determined
probability,from participantswho decided the probabilitywas greateror less than
10%first, and then anchored theirjudgment on this point. Since anchoringis a
well-knownphenomenon(Tversky& Kahneman,1982),findingit in a study with
a salient probability should be expected. We suggest that although anchoring
distortedthe distributionof the probabilityestimates, there is no reason to believe
it affected the way in which the hindsight bias drove the decision to find the
defendantliable.
In referringto the problemas a hindsightbias, however, we do not mean to
suggest that supposedly reasonable minds in foresight do not err in assessing
probabilities.It is possible that people underestimatethe likelihood of that which
has not yet occurred. Instead of "what did happen had to happen" (Fischhoff,
1975), "what has not happenedwill not happen." This would be a foresight bias.
In either case, the tort system promisesto only hold defendantsliablefor the level
of precautions that appeared reasonable to them before an accident occurred.
Thus under any interpretation,the bias ensures that some reasonabledefendants
will feel ambushedby adverse liabilityjudgmentsafter an accident has occurred.
Implications
Findingthe hindsightbias in a genericcase such as this one indicatesthe bias'
potential influence in any negligence case. Since all tort litigation necessarily
involves such ex post judgments, any untaken precautionmay later give rise to
liability,even if that precautioncould not reasonablyhave been justified ex ante.
The data may be interpretedas describing a pervasive flaw in the deterrence
model of torts. Under the deterrence theory, requiringnegligent defendants to
compensate plaintiffsforces them to internalizethe full social costs of their activities (Posner, 1992, pp. 163-167). The theory holds that potential injurers
forced to bear the full costs of their activities will make socially correct choices
about the costs and benefits of precaution,spendingneithertoo much nor too little
on safety. The deterrencetheory has always assumedthat errorsin such estimates
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are random(Grady, 1983). To the extent that attorneys,judges, andjuries reach
estimates of ex ante probabilitiesthat deviate systematicallyfrom the actual ex
ante estimates, potential injurerswill respond by spendingmore on safety precautions than cost-benefit analysis wouldjustify.
Beyond the tort system, the hindsightbias may affectotherareasof law, since
foreseeabilitylimitationspervade legal thinking.A computersearch of the CaliforniaCode reveals that the words "foresight," "foreseeable," "unforeseeable,"
and their variations appear in 193 different statutes. These range from statutes
governingsuch diverse areas as attorney's fees (CaliforniaBusiness and Professions Code, Sec. 6146), endangeredspecies (CaliforniaFish and GameCode, Sec.
2067), pesticides (CaliforniaFood and AgriculturalCode, Sec. 12978),and earthquake education (CaliforniaPublic Resources Code, Sec. 2806). The United
States Code contains 179such referencesand the laws of other states also include
significantuse of the terms (Illinois, 68 statutes; New York, 89; Texas, 80). Furthermore, the applicationof the Hand formulais enormouslypopular.The difficulty of fairly determiningforeseeabilityin hindsightseems to have escaped the
notice of the legislators andjudges.

CONCLUSIONS
Given the presentresearch,this articlecannotoffera solutionto the hindsight
problem. As we have demonstrated,mere judicial instructions are apparently
unable to activate the cognitive processes necessary to reduce the bias. Perhaps
more effective instructionscould neverthelessbe drafted.Othersolutionsfor bias
reduction could include elaboratespecial verdict forms or Wexler and Schopp's
(1989) suggestion on bifurcatingtrials. A special verdict form would contain a
detailed set of instructionsto the jury as to how they should decide the case. It
could direct them to consider alternativeoutcomes and could even requirethem
to write out such alternatives.Since Wigginsand Breckler(1990)have shown that
special verdict forms improve comprehensionof jury instructionsin civil trials,
perhaps such forms could improvethe cognitive processes of jurors as well.
Legal scholars have suspected for some time that the current standardof
deciding negligence in hindsightmay be inadequate(Green, 1977). The bias is
likely to be influencingother legaljudgmentsas well. The ubiquityof foreseeability judgments in law suggests the need for developing effective debiasing techniques.
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